Venue: Modern War Institute
Coauthor: J Andrés Gannon
Abstract: When wars occur, the side that boasts comparatively greater military power is at an advantage but does not always emerge victorious. Why? Several theories offer ostensible answers—war weariness, risk-aversion, military myopia, civil-military relations, miscalculations. We suspected that if we knew how states (and nonstate combatants) fight, we could better answer this consequential why. Aphorisms about winning the battle but losing the war highlight a problem with current approaches. There is a missing middle, an underappreciated meso-level of conflict: operations. Alas, there were little to no data at this level. We created Military Operations with Novel Strategic Technologies in r (MONSTr), an open source and publicly available dataset and website that features: 1) measures of the means of military force across 2) a comprehensive and disaggregated list of US military operations from 1989 to January 2021 that 3) captures dependence between observations. We summarize its distinctive features and future uses.
Venue: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
URL: https://thebulletin.org/2023/11/how-hamas-innovated-with-drones-to-operate-like-an-army/
Coauthor: Ori Swed
Abstract: Hamas’s recent attacks on Israel have shocked many for their brutality and disregard for the norms and laws of armed conflict. They have also surprised experts for their complexity and coordination, involving simultaneous linked and layered operations on land, air, and sea. While Hamas is behaving like the terrorist organization that it is, it is fighting more like a state military force. Imitating and innovating with drones, Hamas is pioneering a new combined arms model with commercial drones that is unusual for terrorist organizations. It constitutes another powerful demonstration point of the prowess terrorists can attain with simple UAS, one that will likely spread as others watch and learn. Contending against avid violent nonstate actors in irregular warfare is already a challenge and will be all the more so as terrorist groups innovate affordable ways to fight like states.
Venue: Modern War Institute
URL: https://mwi.westpoint.edu/hamstrung-sources-of-and-solutions-for-political-military-mismatch/
Coauthor: J Andrés Gannon
Abstract: Many analysts observe that advanced democratic militaries, the US a paragon, are techno-fetishist to a flaw, swept up in the revolution in military affairs that promises to clear the fog of war and insulate soldiers from harm. We argue instead that domestic constraints on political leaders can lead to the tacticization of strategy. When constraints are nominal, the military is granted the freedom of action to optimally contour its force structure. When hamstrung by low public opinion or high uncertainty, executives truncate the options available to high-tech approaches to avert risks and costs that could electorally reverberate. When these options are ill-suited for a given mission, the military will be challenged to attain success. In these cases, the US should either refrain from intervention, require multilateral engagement to share risks and costs, or outsource them to private military companies.
Venue: Arms Control Today
URL: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-01/features/learning-fly-drones-russian-ukrainian-war
Abstract: The international community has watched with bated breath as Ukrainians resisted, even routed, Russian forces on many fronts since the latter’s invasion in February 2022. Based on its size, reputation, and bravado, many, including the Kremlin, expected the Russian military to trounce its target in short order. Instead, its stunted progress has induced plenty of double-takes and debates, suggesting flaws in Russian intelligence, motivation, morale, and logistics. There is likely some truth in each of those explanations, but one factor stands out for its differential use and power to explain the Ukrainian upset: drones. The Ukrainians have held the line because they harnessed a crucial human and technological resource at their disposal, commercial drones, which have been decisive in the unexpected outcome so far. The Russians faltered because they overlooked them, but they are resurging because they learned from it. These lessons have implications for the current and future wars, for preponderant militaries such as the United States all the way to under-resourced rebels.
Venue: War on the Rocks
Coauthor: Ori Swed
Abstract: In 1991, the USSR collapsed and billions of dollars of military equipment was black-marketed. In 2011, Libya crumbled and small arms and lights weapons (SALW) were sold as far as Syria. In both cases, illicit SALW trafficking generated and augmented violence in the surrounding regions. We describe this process, then speculate on the implications of Afghanistan’s collapse and the Russo-Ukrainian War before concluding with some prescriptions.
Venue: War Room
URL: https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/terrorist-drones/
Coauthor: Ori Swed
Abstract: The surging commercial UAV industry has granted terrorists sudden and broad access to affordable, yet effective airpower. As a result, the offense-defense dialectic risks tilting in their tactical favor. Consumer UAVs are inexpensive, user-friendly, and sufficient for terrorists’ tasks. Furthermore, the commercial drone industry is delivering more functionality and autonomy as it hustles to meet consumer demand in multiple industries. Framing this dynamic in Plato’s Allegory of the Cave, we urge greater attention to the breadth and depth of terrorist drone use for prudent response.